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INTRODUCTION 
n an 1898 serialized science fiction novel, Thomas Edison travels to 
space in true Victorian fashion, taking with him a menagerie of 
scientists from Earth including geologists and miners to go and 
attack Mars.  As their adventures ensue, the intrepid group of explorers 
finds an asteroid made of gold that is actively being mined by the 
Martians: 
The more we saw of this golden planet the greater became our 
astonishment. What the Martians had removed was a mere 
nothing in comparison with the entire bulk of the asteroid. Had 
the celestial mine been easier to reach, perhaps they would have 
removed more, or, possibly, their political economists perfectly 
understood the necessity of properly controlling the amount of 
precious metal in circulation. Very likely, we thought, the mining 
operations were under government control in Mars and it might 
be that the majority of the people there knew nothing of this store 
of wealth floating in the firmament.1 
Ever since this publication, one of the ongoing themes found in both 
science fiction and science fact is a human desire to access that “store of 
wealth floating in the firmament.” Interestingly, this early work recognizes 
not just the technical difficulties with extracting resources from space but 
also the governance obstacles of such activities. 
Today, these same difficulties and obstacles remain despite the 
tremendous advances in both technology and governance. Setting aside the 
technical issues, the current challenge for both law and policy flows 
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primarily from Article II of the Outer Space Treaty, which prohibits states 
from “appropriating” space, the Moon, and other celestial bodies.  The 
problem is that Article II is notoriously ambiguous in its wording and its 
implications for property rights, both in terms of real property and in terms 
of chattel property over extracted space resources.  While this ambiguity 
has been a boon to scholars looking for tenuous situations to write articles 
on, it is now being cast as an obstacle for an emerging group of private 
enterprises that aim to extract and to use for commercial purposes the vast 
resources that are floating in the firmament.  This article will delve into this 
ambiguity in order to elucidate the content of the Article II norm in light of 
its history and of state practice. 
This article will first contextualize Article II to better understand its 
origins.  This section will argue that the original intent behind the adoption 
of Article II was to settle questions of international geography, namely the 
nature of state territory in space, which accounts for its silence in terms of 
property.  This discussion will lay the foundation for the ensuing analysis 
of property in the outer space environment.  The second section of this 
article will examine a variety of precedents that help reveal the nature of 
Article II as understood by the state parties to the Outer Space Treaty in 
relation to space resources.  This analysis will examine state practice with 
regard to territorial claims, real property claims, and chattel property 
claims, which all touch on the legal content of Article II.  Finally, this article 
will address the future of the non-appropriation principle and argue that it 
can accommodate both the maintenance of stability and security in space as 
well as proposed commercial use and exploitation of space resources. This 
section will conclude by arguing that states should avoid a race to bottom 
in terms of developing legal regimes surrounding property rights and 
resource extraction in space by balancing the benefit of the commercial 
activity with the values and principles that underpin international space 
law. 
Before starting in this endeavor, it is important to note what this article 
will not do.  First, this article will focus squarely on the law and policy 
found within the bounds of the Outer Space Treaty and customary 
international law.  It will not delve into the Moon Agreement in depth, 
though reference will be made as needed.  This is because the Moon 
Agreement, while positing a workable system for the use and exploitation 
of extraterrestrial resources, has not been widely accepted and serves a 
minor role in the contemporary regime. Second, this article will not attempt 
to offer a solution to the Article II problem.  While it will suggest that there 
are core values that need to be implemented in any regime or institution 
that regulates resource extraction, whether domestic or international, it will 
stop short of detailing specific recommendations for those regimes. 
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I. A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to the Moon 
The non-appropriation principle first found its way into the vocabulary 
of international space law in the 1961 United Nations General Assembly 
(UNGA) resolution on outer space.  Resolution 1721 (XVI) “commends” 
states to use space according to two principles: 
(a) International law, including the Charter of the United 
Nations, applies to outer space and celestial bodies; 
(b) Outer space and celestial bodies are free for exploration and 
use by all States in conformity with international law and are not 
subject to national appropriation.2 
This is the first time that a UNGA resolution refers to “principles” 
guiding space activities.3  As a result, these two principles maintain a place 
of primacy in space law and touch on the legality of all space activities 
engaged in or attributable to states.  To add weight to this proposition, this 
resolution was decided without a vote, meaning that if not unanimous 
there was, at least, little controversy in the content of these provisions.4 Of 
course, it is prudent to note that a UNGA resolution is not binding on 
states, but unanimous adoption of “principles” is at the very least strong 
indication of international political will.5 
What we see then, at the earliest inception of rules regulating space, is 
an emerging consensus as to the application of international law as a 
governing system, and the exclusion of space and celestial bodies from 
“appropriation,” whatever that may mean.6 Over fifty years later, these 
principles remain at the core of the international space law regime as 
Articles I, II, and III of the Outer Space Treaty.  But, to be quippy, a funny 
thing happened on the way to the Moon.  While the application of 
international law to outer space has remained non-controversial, the 
content of Article II has increasingly been the target of criticism by 
scholars, politicians, and commercial actors alike.  This criticism posits that 
 
2  G.A. Res. 1721, U.N. GAOR, 16th Sess., Supp. No. 17, vol. XVI, at 6, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/1721 (XVI) (1961). 
3   See, e.g., G.A. Res. 1348, U.N. GAOR, 13th Sess., Supp. No. 18, vol. I, at 5–6, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/1348 (XIII) (1958); G.A. Res. 1472, U.N. GAOR, 14th Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 5, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/1472 (XIV) (1959) (illustrating that while earlier resolutions do not mention items such 
as “benefit of all mankind” and “peaceful purposes,” which later becomes principles guiding 
outer space activity, they fall short of referring to them as such”).  
4  Resolutions Adopted by the General Assembly at its 16th Session, UNITED NATIONS, 
https://perma.cc/4927-DS7T (last updated June 4, 2019). 
5  See BIN CHENG, STUDIES IN INT’L SPACE LAW 136–37 (1997) (arguing that under certain 
circumstances UNGA resolutions can create “instant” customary law, but he argues against 
these early resolutions taking on such status).  
6  G.A. Res. 1962, U.N. GAOR, 18th Sess., Supp. No. 15, vol. XVIII, at 15, U.N. Doc 
A/RES/1962 (vol. XVIII) (1963) (confirming a set of “legal principles” that govern outer space).  
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non-appropriation, instead of being a critical principle in international 
space law, is a central downfall in the entire regime. 
This section seeks to trace this history, and contextualize non-
appropriation within the competing narratives on its purpose to better 
understand how the consensus seen in the early UNGA resolutions has 
eroded.  It will argue that non-appropriation was a mechanism through 
which the outer space environment could be brought into the logics of 
international geography, and that this has left severe ambiguity as to the 
nature of property rights in space and over space resources. 
A.  International Geography 
Before jumping into the specifics of the non-appropriation principle, it 
is important to characterize it within the larger legal system.  While 
international space law is a lex specialis, it exists within the confines and 
logics of international law.  Resolution 1721 (XVI) acknowledged that 
states, as the traditional subjects of international law, agreed that 
international law would be the governing system in outer space.  At the 
time, this was critically important.  International law, and importantly its 
core goals, were significantly remade after World War II through the 
adoption of the UN Charter, which deployed a specific geography that will 
be referred to as the “international geography” herein. 
The post-1945 settlement of international law represents the most 
recent in a number of reorganizations of “world-scale” governance.7  
Stemming from the European tradition, the history of international law is 
marked by the accommodation of new areas or spaces that do not fit within 
the scope of the reigning contemporary spatial order.  Indeed, the roots of 
international law attempt to explain how the high seas and the newly 
discovered (by the Europeans, at least) New World fit within the settled 
spatial order at the time.8  Similarly, the Peace of Westphalia redeployed 
geography within Europe to establish the concept of territorial sovereignty 
through the establishment of the state as an entity.9  Throughout each of 
these iterations of geography, the developing international legal system 
sought to categorize all physical areas and impose on each a specific legal 
geography. 
The result of World War II, in legal terms, was no different.  The UN 
Charter imposes a specific legal geography at the world-scale, which 
 
7  See SASKIA SASSEN, TERRITORY, AUTHORITY, RIGHTS: FROM MEDIEVAL TO GLOBAL 
ASSEMBLAGES 14 (2006). 
8  See CARL SCHMITT, THE NOMOS OF THE EARTH IN THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE JUS 
PUBLICUM EUROPAEUM 42–44, 86, 140 (2003); MANFRED LACHS,  
THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE: AN EXPERIENCE IN CONTEMPORARY LAW-MAKING 19–20 (2010); IAN 
CLARK, LEGITIMACY IN INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 35–38 (2005). 
9  SCHMITT, supra note 8, at 143–45. 
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shapes the contours of global order.  This order again attempts to 
encompass all spatial areas on Earth and apply specific legal categorization 
to each area. At the highest level, the system differentiates between spaces 
that are state territories or spaces that are non-territorial, such as global 
commons.10 Territory is the space within a state’s borders, and is therefore 
subject to the local rules of that state. The UN system allows states to 
become members of the UN, which grants them the right to have their 
“territorial integrity” respected by other members.11 The UN system does 
allow for non-self-governing areas, which are those overseen by another 
state or the UN. These spaces are excluded from UN membership, but the 
governing authority is given the duty to “their progressive development 
towards self-government or independence,” indicating the goal that these 
spaces become territory.12  This second category is notable because the UN 
Charter began the process of delegitimizing colonization and conquest by 
force as the age of empires wound to a close.  The international geography 
deployed by the UN Charter is one in which land area is (or as soon as is 
feasible in the future will be) part of the territorial sovereignty of a state.  It 
attempts to create a seamless geography of hard borders that are legally 
impervious from interference from external entities.13  Territory in this 
system becomes synonymous with legal personhood, and the right to 
exclude others from it are connected less with notions of ownership and 
more with notions of political autonomy of each state as a sovereign equal. 
The 1945 system adopted the traditional rules governing the high seas 
since they were traditionally outside of state territory, as indicated by the 
historical three-mile rule, which represented the physical limitations of 
state control in terms of the distance a cannonball could fire.14 Early on the 
system was presented with the problem of the status of Antarctica.  Under 
the traditional rules, states had made imperialist claims to the Antarctic 
continent.  Antarctica, though, was not so much the introduction of new 
physical space as much as it was a problem of sorting out competing claims 
that emerged within the previous legal system.  Antarctic law functions 
based on the permanent suspension of territorial claims to the landmass by 
the states that maintained them at the dawn of the modern system.15 
Therefore, outer space became the first challenge to the new system of 
 
10  See P.J. Blount & Christian J. Robison, One Small Step: The Impact of the U.S. Commercial 
Space Launch Competitiveness Act of 2015 on the Exploitation of Resources in Outer Space, 18 N.C. J. 
L. & TECH. 160, 170–72 (2016) (discussing global commons as a typology of spatial order). 
11  U.N. CHARTER, art. 2, para 4.  
12  U.N. CHARTER, art. 76(b).  
13  See SCHMITT, supra note 8, at 185, 187 (referring to the “bracketing” of war).  
14  SCHMITT, supra note 8, at 183. 
15  Antarctic Treaty, Dec. 1, 1959, T.I.A.S. No. 4780, 402 U.N.T.S 71, 12 E.S.T. 794, (entered 
into force June 23, 1961). 
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international law in terms of the introduction of new spatial possibilities, 
and it cannot be overstated that new spatial possibilities had the potential 
to shake the new system to its core.  A critical goal of a seamless 
international geography was the elimination of war.  The architects of the 
system would have been acutely aware that historically a major cause of 
war was the military conquest of new territories, which was the hallmark 
of the preceding imperial system of world-scale governance. While the 
orbiting of Sputnik I ushered a myriad of issues into world politics, central 
to these was how to keep conflict resulting from territorial conquest of 
space.  Such conquest was de-legitimized as a matter of international law in 
the post-1945 settlement, which rejected imperialism as a mechanism of 
world-scale governance. However, this depended on the seamless 
international geography imposed by the UN Charter, which did not 
contemplate space activities. Extending international law into space was 
the first step in making space part of the international geography and 
rejecting notions of imperial conquest.  The non-apporpriation principle, in 
effect, categorizes space and celestial bodies as “not territory” so as to 
revoke the incentives that drive such conquest. 
Article II must be read in terms of its fit within the international legal 
system as a rejection of imperial processes within outer space or on 
celestial bodies. Its core goal, similar to international law in general, is not 
to characterize territory or things as “ownable,” but instead to promote 
international peace and security by delineating between the spatial area in 
which a state has sovereignty and spatial areas in which the state does not. 
Rather than “ownability,” the non-appropriation principle is about 
“rulability,” that is whether or not a state can govern a territory. 
B.  The Outer Space Treaty and the Geography of Space 
It is within this context that we must approach the non-appropriation 
principle as codified in Article II of the Outer Space Treaty.  This 
subsection will attempt to show how Article II functions within the text of 
the treaty as a whole, and indicate the ambiguities inherent in the 
construction of Article II. 
Article II states simply that “outer space, including the moon and other 
celestial bodies, is not subject to national appropriation by claim of 
sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means.”16  
Before delving into the text of the provision itself, it should be noted that 
the non-appropriation principle was well established by the time that the 
Outer Space Treaty was negotiated through consecutive consensus 
 
16  Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of 
Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies art. II, Sept. 25, 1967, 610 
U.N.T.S. 205 (entered into force Oct. 10 1967) [hereinafter Outer Space Treaty]. 
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adopted UNGA resolutions.17  Further, the Outer Space Treaty was a 
product of the consensus process of the UN Committee on the Peaceful 
Uses of Outer Space (UNCOPUOS).18  At the international level there was 
consensus on the principle.  Indeed, as Gangale shows us, the principle was 
not the subject of intense debate either during the negotiation process nor 
the ratification process.19   
The states that were adopting the treaty did not understand Article II 
to be in conflict with either international law or domestic law.  It is 
submitted that this is because states primarily understood Article II as an 
articulation of international geography rather than an articulation of a 
limitation on the right to use outer space and celestial bodies, a right that 
takes a primary position in Article I of the Outer Space Treaty.  As a result, 
the travaeux preparatoires does little to elucidate the content of Article II as it 
relates to ideas of property.20  While Article II itself is ambiguous, it is 
important to remember that it must be read within the overall purpose and 
scope of the treaty as other treaty provisions can add significantly to our 
understanding of Article II.21 
The first thing to note is that Article II effectuates a ban on “national 
appropriation,” but this term is not defined.  Even more problematic, the 
legal term is unique to the space context and is not found in other 
international agreements governing non-territorial areas. Indeed, 
international law is most often concerned with the “acquisition” of 
territory.22  Non-appropriation does, however, ring true to the anti-imperial 
aspirations of the Outer Space Treaty, which tracks with the ideological 
common ground between the two Cold War superpowers of the US and 
the USSR.  It also tracks with the newly deployed international geography, 
which for the first time in global history attempted to contain all terrestrial 
spaces within the bounds of national borders that marked states as holders 
of legal personhood within the system.  This legal autonomy was protected 
by a legal prohibition against the use of force, which was intended to 
 
17  Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and 
Use of Outer Space, Dec. 13, 1963, U.N.G.A. Res. 18/62 (stating that the 1963 Declaration of 
Legal Principles is widely accepted as a statement of customary international law); G.A. Res. 
1962, U.N. GAOR, 18th Sess., Supp. No. 15, vol. XVIII, at 15, U.N. Doc A/RES/1962 (vol. XVIII) 
(1963) (confirming a set of “legal principles” that govern outer space). 
18  Sergio Marchisio, The Evolutionary Stages of the Legal Subcommittee of the United Nations 
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS), 31 J. SPACE L. 219, 224 (2005). 
19  Thomas Gangale, The Legality of Mining Celestial Bodies, 40 J. SPACE L. 187, 193 (2015–
2016). 
20  Id. at 196–205. 
21  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31, Dec. 28, 1979, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 
(entered into force Jan. 27, 1980). 
22  MARTIN DIXON, TEXTBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL LAW, 161 (7th ed. 2013); R.Y. JENNINGS, 
THE ACQUISITION OF TERRITORY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 1–2 (1963). 
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harden those borders against conquest. 
The discrepancy between the idea of appropriation and the idea of 
acquisition is not a large one.  “To appropriate” means to “take exclusive 
possession of,” and “to acquire” means to “get as one’s own.”23  Both of 
these imply the idea of ownership, but “to appropriate” is a more active 
form in that it requires an affirmative act, whereas “to acquire” includes 
possibilities of coming into possession without affirmative action.  In other 
words, if one finds a painting on the sidewalk and keeps it, that individual 
has both acquired and appropriated the painting. Whereas if the painting is 
left as an inheritance in a will, it has been acquired but not appropriated.  
The distinction may seem subtle, but it is an important one in light of the 
text following the ban on national appropriation, which enumerates ways 
in which appropriation might happen. This text names three ways in which 
appropriation is disallowed. 
First, Article II disallows national appropriation by “a claim of 
sovereignty.”  Under international law, an “apparent display of 
sovereignty” is “at the heart of acquisition of sovereignty.”24 Historically, 
this concept is linked directly to the idea of planting a flag on new territory 
as a way of claiming it for the state, as well as the removal of the previous 
sovereign’s flag upon defeating that sovereign.  Flag planting was an overt 
imperial act through which a state added new territories, and the flag itself 
represented not only the sovereign, but also the military force that the 
sovereign might employ to defend the claim.  Article II then can be read as 
outlawing the practice of “claiming sovereignty” in an imperial manner 
over newly discovered areas in the outer space environment. 
Second, Article II makes clear that national appropriation cannot occur 
as the result of use or occupation by a state.  Indeed, the international law 
system does not recognize simple claims of sovereignty, for these to 
convert into territorial acquisition there must be a showing of “effective 
occupation,” even in the case of newly discovered uninhabited territory.25 
This second Article II prohibition separates the idea of occupation from 
territorial acquisition in space.  It is important to note that the ban on 
“national appropriation” by “occupation or use” is not equivalent to a ban 
on occupation or use of outer space and celestial bodies.  Indeed, such an 
interpretation would destroy the internal logic of the Outer Space Treaty.  
Article I of the Outer Space Treaty specifically gives states the right to 
“use” outer space and celestial bodies. Further, Article XII acknowledges 
that states may have “stations” and “installations” on the Moon and other 
celestial bodies, meaning that some form of occupation is indeed allowable 
 
23  WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 18, 106 (Phillip Babcock Gove ed., 3d 
ed. 2002). 
24  DIXON, supra note 22, at 162. 
25  DIXON, supra note 22, at 167. 
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under the Outer Space Treaty.  If Article II is understood as a ban on 
occupation and use, then the entire treaty descends into incoherency.  
Article II, in this respect, must be understood as banning something very 
specific, which is the acquisition of territory over which the sovereign has 
full authority that results from occupation or use. 
The final prohibition in Article II is the most open ended as it bans 
“national appropriation . . . by any other means.”26  This open endedness, 
of course, makes it quite difficult to apply.27 It is unclear what might 
constitute another means of appropriation.28  Some indication can be found 
in the two previous prohibitions, which track with historical methods 
under international law for the acquisition of national territory.29  
Therefore, it is safe to say that other methods, maybe less likely ones, are 
also illegal such as conquest by force or the use of a bilateral treaty.30  The 
problem is that this clause’s indefiniteness leaves open an array of activities 
that may or may not constitute an appropriation under Article II.31  For 
instance, if a state were to recognize a real property interest in a tract on a 
celestial body, would that amount to an Article II appropriation?32 This 
question will be returned to below. 
The text does contain an important clue to sorting out Article II in such 
a way that it makes sense in relation to the rest of the treaty, which, as 
already noted, allows for use and occupation.33  Astute readers have likely 
already been pondering the meaning of the adjective “national” in front of 
appropriation.34  Article II does not ban all appropriations, it bans 
appropriations of a national character, that is appropriations that link 
physical areas of outer space to the legal personhood of the state.35  The 
post 1945 international geography associated legal autonomy with 
territory.36  The idea of the United Nations is built on sovereign equality of 
independent territories, and the UN Charter is directed at establishing 
 
26  United Nations Treaties and Principles on Outer Space art. II, 2008 U.N.T.S. 11.  
27  See Stephen Gorove, Interpreting Article II of the Outer Space Treaty, 37 FORDHAM L. REV. 
349, 349 (1969). 
28  See Gorove, supra note 27 at 349. 
29  See Gorove, supra note 27 at 350. 
30  DIXON, supra note 22 at 167–69 (noting that the Article IV ban on weapons of any sort on 
celestial bodies confirms the idea that military conquest is banned).  
31  NEED THROUGH ILL 
32  See Robert Kelly, Note, Nemitz v. United States, a Case of First Impression: Appropriation, 
Private Property Rights and Space Law before the Federal Courts of the United States, 30 J. Space L. 
297, 305–09 (2004).  
33  Outer Space Treaty, supra note 16.  
34  Outer Space Treaty, supra note 16.  
35  Outer Space Treaty, supra note 16. 
36  THE POLITICS OF GLOBALITY SINCE 1945 2–4 (Rens van Munster & Casper Sylvest, eds., 
2016).  
104 New England  Law Review  [Vol. 52 | 2 
“friendly relations among nations.”37 The post-1945 international 
geography is one concerned with solidifying nations by linking them with 
distinct territory, and the introduction of the vastness of space served to 
destabilize the new balance struck among nations.38  As a result, the non-
appropriation principle is directly connected to the idea of national or state 
action through which a state may appropriate part of the vastness of space 
into its own legal personality as a state.39  This is confirmed by Article VI of 
the Outer Space Treaty, which holds states responsible for the “national 
activities” of non-governmental actors.40  Again, in context the “national” 
indicates a nexus with the state and therefore a nexus with national 
territory.41  It should be noted that even in the various UNGA resolutions 
“appropriation” is preceded by “national” further indicating that the core 
concern of the principle is with actions that create a nexus between an area 
in outer space and the territorial identity of a state.42 
This section has argued that as a matter of international law, Article II 
is concerned with the acquisition of territory by a state and the extension of 
sovereignty over that territory.  This interpretation places Article II in a 
state of coherence with the rest of the treaty, but it does not solve the 
deeper problem of the status of property rights by private entities in the 
space environment.  This is because, while Article II is, in this author’s 
opinion, purposely silent on the issue of property, it is not entirely 
disconnected from the concept of property.  Quite the contrary, in the 
international geography deployed by the UN Charter the idea of property 
is directly connected to a state’s territory and its sovereign authority over 
that territory. This issue will be taken up in the next subsection. 
C.  Property 
It is this author’s anecdotal experience that, in general, when the idea 
of space law is first suggested to someone unfamiliar with the concept that 
person’s most likely response is: “you mean like who owns the Moon?” 
Methodological considerations of this survey aside, this response is 
revealing.  The law in this case is quickly associated with the question of 
the division of spatial territory into legal categorizations.  Other topics, 
 
37  U.N. CHARTER, art. 1, para. 2.   
38  THE POLITICS OF GLOBALITY SINCE 1945  3 (Rens van Munster & Casper Sylvest, eds., 
2016). 
39  Fabio Tronchetti, The Non-Appropriation Principle Under Attack: Using Article II of the 
Outer Space Treaty in its Defence, (50th International Colloquium on the Law of Outer Space) 1 
(2017). 
40  Outer Space Treaty, supra note 16. 
41  Outer Space Treaty, supra note 16. 
42  G.A. Res. 72/77, U.N. GAOR, International Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Outer 
Space, U.N. Doc. A/Res/72/77 (2017). 
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such as liability for torts or contracts involved in space activities are 
secondary in the general legal imagination.  We, as a society, want to know 
who owns a place because it is fundamental to our conception of law.43  
Ownership is an effect of the legal situation of the territory in which you 
are standing, so while the idea of territory is separate from property, the 
nature of property is an effect of territorial division.44  This is because as a 
matter of contemporary international law, property is a local issue and its 
nature changes as an individual moves from one autonomous territory to 
another.45 
Article II is silent on property.  It neither confirms that property rights 
may exist, nor does it affirmatively deny such rights.46  This leaves a deep 
rift between the concepts of territory and property, which is one of the 
reasons that Article II is so hotly debated.47  This rift exposes the tension 
between the post-1945 territorial settlement and the roots of international 
law, because it forces the question of whether property rights can exist 
without sanction by a state.48  Thus, to truly grasp the meaning of Article II, 
it is important to understand that international law itself is a product of the 
development of a Western liberal world order.  International law emerges 
from the European continent in the form of rules that European powers 
used to stabilize the region and differentiate it from other regions that 
could be subjected to European power.49  Indeed, until 1945, the idea of 
“civilized” reigned supreme in determining which territories had rights 
under international law and which might be subject to imperial power.50 
Not surprisingly, in the early days Europe was “civilized” and the rest of 
the world was not.51  As subsequent iterations of international legal order 
 
43  SCHMITT, supra note 8, at 42. (This is why Schmitt argues that “[l]aw is bound to the 
earth and related to the earth.”). 
44  See Anna Stilz, Nations, States, and Territory, 121 ETHICS 572, 572 (2011) (To be clear, this 
is not a natural or necessary structure.  For instance, if the political will was extant, then states 
could adopt within international law universal articulations of property rights.  The fact that 
states did not do this pushes the notion of property to the territorial sovereign to decide.) 
45  See John G. Sprankling, The Emergence of International Property Law, 90 N.C. L. REV. 461, 
463 (2012).  
46  See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 16. 
47  See Timothy Justin Trapp, Taking Up Space by Any Other Means: Coming to Terms With the 
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were articulated and more places became “civilized” in a European sense, 
the global spatial order was reworked, but within a framework built on 
pre-existing Western values.52 
Of great importance to the topic at hand, a Western liberal system 
meant that natural law theory and specifically a Lockean conception of 
property was integrated into the international legal system. John Locke’s 
theory of property was that in a state of nature, humans could expend 
labor to improve a spatial area and that they thereby gained a natural right 
of ownership over that area effectively converting it into property.53  
Lockean philosophy is often used to justify property rights in outer space, 
and invoked as a natural right that supersedes international law and 
Article II specifically.54  This argument assumes that if an individual were 
to go into space and exert labor to develop a celestial body, then that 
portion over which labor was exerted should become the property of that 
individual as a natural right that exists outside the scope of the state.  Such 
a right has been acknowledged in international law, and there are 
numerous nineteenth and early twentieth century cases that acknowledge 
such rights in situations when an individual has labored to improve land in 
a territory that is res nullius and which is subsequently subject to a claim of 
sovereignty.55  This conception casts property as a natural right that 
precedes the establishment of sovereignty over territory. 
The Lockean argument has three important limitations in its 
application to outer space.  The first limitation is theoretical.  Locke’s 
natural right only exists in a state of nature, and it acknowledges that 
government becomes a necessary condition for maintaining that right.  In 
Locke’s state of nature, the natural right is a moral one, but is still subject to 
superior force of others.  As a result, Locke’s state of nature demands the 
establishment of positive property rights protected within society through 
governmental functions to ensure that force does not become the true 
measure of property rights.  Locke’s theory to some extent embraces the 
idea that, though property may naturally occur, the state becomes a 
necessary entity for its preservation. 
The second limitation is the extent to which we can say Lockean theory 
is part of the post-1945 international legal system, which is avowedly 
positivistic.  One of the issues that the negotiators of the UN system had to 
account for, to ensure a seamless international geography, was the need to 
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have all global powers be a party to the new system despite their 
ideological differences.  The problem of non-participation was all too 
evident in the failure of the League of Nations. The negotiators needed to 
accommodate not just Western liberal political systems, but Marxist 
systems as well.  Marxist systems, obviously, maintain a fundamentally 
different conception of property that rejects Lockean ideals.  This is why, 
under international law, property is treated as a local issue.  Like other 
human rights, states were left substantially free to order property within 
their borders in any way that was deemed fit by the governing authority. 
Property became a function of a state’s domestic law, and to this day all 
states maintain different sets of rights applicable to property ownership 
within their borders based on the physical characteristics of the territory 
and the political ideology of the government.  This positivistic turn in 
international law uproots Locke as a foundational theory in order to 
achieve a seamless global geography through the inclusion of non-Lockean 
systems. 
 The final limitation to the Lockean argument is that Articles II and III 
of the Outer Space Treaty serve to eliminate the state of nature.  Locke’s 
state of nature is best understood as a thought experiment to imagine how 
law emerges when there is no law.  Locke’s notion was linked to spaces 
that sat outside of legal jurisdiction.56 While the space environment is for 
the most part untouched by humans and still exists in its “natural state,” 
space is not a state of nature in Lockean terms because a governance 
system has been imposed on it.  Article III of the Outer Space Treaty 
effectively extends international law into the space domain, meaning that a 
legal regime exists there.  Further, Article I and II serve to acknowledge 
that states do not view outer space as res nullius, that is as belonging to no 
one and therefore subject to conversion into property through labor.  
Instead, the Outer Space Treaty, in addition to the non-appropriation 
principle, states that space is the “province of all mankind,” which most 
commentators have deemed to create a res communis or in more modern 
terms a global commons.57  While the use of ancient Roman legal terms has 
rightfully been critiqued,58 it is very clear that the legal status of space is 
different in kind than the theoretical state of nature as described by Locke. 
The problem that results is that states are free to explore and use space, 
as are their authorized private actors, but states are unable to appropriate 
space “by any other means.” This results in significant limitations on a 
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state’s ability to protect property rights that could result from such use.  If 
a state were to sanction a private claim for real property in space, it could 
amount to an assertion of sovereignty over the territory containing the 
claimed property.  Thus, claims of real property that assert exclusive 
control over a spatial territory in space are likely prohibited by Article II, 
due to the fact that state parties are disallowed from enforcing such rights.  
This should not be surprising as similar claims to the high seas, deep 
seabed, or Antarctica would have similar difficulties due to a state’s 
inability to enforce those rights.  This however, is not the end of the story, 
because states can and do recognize property rights in movable property 
that is attained outside its borders and specifically from global commons. 
While each of the above mentioned global commons excludes the 
possibility of claims for real property, each has a unique regime for the 
exploitation of the resources found within.  The Antarctic regime bans all 
commercial use, whereas the deep seabed regime establishes an 
international organization for the management of rights over extracted 
resources. The high seas regime allows private actors to extract resources at 
will, as long as they are in compliance of the laws of their local flag state 
(which often incorporate international obligations), and gain direct 
property rights over those resources, namely fish.  This illustrates that 
under international law, the legal recognition of rights in extracted 
resources is a possibility in a global commons as part of the international 
geography. The question is whether Article II allows such recognition.  The 
answer to this is murky at best due to the ambiguous language of the Outer 
Space Treaty.  However, we can look to state practice to see how states are 
interpreting their obligations under Article II. 
II. Space Property in State Practice 
State practice on the nature of property rights in space is scant.  Few 
states have the technological capability simply to make it to celestial bodies 
much less to maintain activities or return resources.  The record is not 
devoid of state practice, though.  There are hints at how states interpret 
their obligations under Article II that help to clear up some of its 
ambiguous language.  This practice falls into the following categories: 
direct state action in space relating to territory and resources, private 
claims to real property in space, and private ownership of extracted 
celestial material. 
A. States in Space 
Three states have effectively gone to celestial bodies and returned with 
celestial material from space to Earth: the United States, the Soviet Union, 
and Japan.  Each of these states’ actions constitute state practice under 
Article II.  This section will address two aspects of these missions: first, the 
way that states behaved in relation to possible territorial claims made by 
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their landings; and second, the way in which states have behaved in 
relation to the extracted portions of those celestial bodies. 
1. Territorial Claims 
To be clear, no state has ever claimed any part of a celestial body as its 
sovereign territory.  The lack of these types of claims is an important 
indicator of the content of Article II, but analysis should not stop there as 
there is definite nuance to the way in which states, and specifically the 
United States, have treated their interactions with celestial bodies. 
In 1959, the Soviet Union became the first state to launch a spacecraft 
that reached the surface of the moon, Luna-2.  This craft engaged in 
scientific experiments, but a notable aspect of it was that it contained a 
spherical device with pendants or medallions that were intended to scatter 
on the surface of the Moon upon impact, presuming they survived the 
impact. These medallions contained the state symbol of the USSR, and the 
words “USSR September 1959” (in Russian of course).59  The placement of a 
state symbol on the Lunar surface bears significant resemblance to imperial 
practice of planting a flag, a symbol of state sovereignty, on newly 
discovered territory as an assertion of a state’s rights to that territory.  
However, there is no indication that the Soviet Union ever asserted such 
rights to the territory touched by these medallions.  At the time, Luna-2 was 
painted as a victory for the Soviet space program, which was quickly 
racking up “firsts” in space much to the United States’ dismay.  Days after 
the Luna-2 impact, Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev landed in the United 
States for a state visit.  Though tensions were high between the Cold War 
leaders, Khrushchev presented President Eisenhower with a replica of the 
Luna-2 sphere, as both a sign of international friendship and a Cold War 
jab.60  It should also be noted that the Soviet Union, upon signing the Outer 
Space Treaty made no mention of any claim effectuated by the Luna-2 
landing, and its acceptance of the treaty can be seen as disclaiming any 
residual claims that it may have retained. 
The United States became the first nation to land a human on the Moon 
in 1969 with its Apollo 11 mission. Apollo 11 astronauts, and those of the 
subsequent Apollo missions, planted a United States flag on the surface of 
the Moon.  Similar to Luna-2, this act has all the trappings of traditional 
imperial claims to newly discovered territory.  In fact, the Apollo missions 
amplify this through the use of an actual flag, which carries specific 
significance when associated with a sovereign power, and also through the 
accompanying human presence, which could be argued to give more 
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substance to a possible claim than a spacecraft alone.  Unlike Luna-2, the 
Moon landing occurred in the wake of the Outer Space Treaty, and the 
United States at the time was keen to ensure that it complied with the 
treaty in order to maintain international peace and security.  As a result, 
each of the Apollo landers, which remained on the lunar surface along with 
the flags they carried, had a plaque attached to them that served to 
disclaim any notion of conquest by the United States.  The Apollo 11 
placard specifically did this stating: “Here men from the planet Earth first 
set foot upon the Moon, July 1969 AD. We came in peace for all 
mankind.”61 
There are two important aspects to this placard.  First, it characterizes 
the astronauts simply as “men” rather than as representatives of a specific 
sovereign.62  Second, it echoes the notion found throughout international 
space law that space should be used for peace and for the benefit of all 
humankind.  What this placard serves to do is represent the actions of the 
Apollo astronauts as being on the behalf of the entire global population.  
While the United States certainly wanted its mark on that landing, thus the 
flag, the words that it used to describe the landing did not assert any claim 
of sovereignty. This is of course echoed by Neil Armstrong’s words, 
broadcast internationally, that this was “one small step for man, one giant 
leap for mankind.” 
What can be gathered from the actions of these two states is that claims 
of an imperial nature, that is those made through discovery of new 
territory in space, do not fall within the confines of that which is allowed 
by Article II.  This of course tracks with the anti-imperial language that 
these two superpowers were able to agree on when negotiating the Outer 
Space Treaty. 
There is one small coda that should be included here.  In 1976, eight 
equatorial countries issued the Bogata Declaration as a protest to what they 
felt was an inequitable division of the Geosynchronous Orbit (GEO).63  The 
declaration stated that each of the countries claimed sovereignty over the 
portion of the GEO orbit that was directly above their territory.  This claim 
was built on the idea that GEO is a natural resource, and that its unique 
physical characteristics linked it directly to the territory below.  Colombia 
went so far as to include this claim in its Constitution.64  In general, the 
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international community has never recognized these claims.  Additionally, 
all of these states are participants in the International Telecommunication 
Union (ITU), which coordinates GEO usage, five are state parties to the 
Outer Space Treaty, and two more have signed but not ratified the Outer 
Space Treaty.65  Also of note is that the ITU was reorganized in the early 
1990s in part to better address the claims of developing nations to access to 
telecommunications including GEO.66  As a result, the Bogota Declaration 
is likely now little more than a historical footnote, and its rejection by the 
international community indicates a rejection of territorial claims in space. 
2. Sample Return 
There are three examples of states engaging in sample return missions.  
A sample return mission is a mission that endeavors to collect matter from 
space and return it to the surface of the Earth. 
The first of these missions was Apollo 11, and each subsequent Apollo 
mission returned to the surface of the Earth with lunar material.67  
Interestingly, the Apollo 11 astronauts filled out a customs form 
acknowledging the importation of the material.68  The lunar samples that 
were returned, are administered by NASA.  In addition to research done by 
the United States with these samples, the United States distributed these 
samples to other states for the purposes of scientific research and also as 
diplomatic gifts. Both of these uses of the lunar samples can be argued to 
support the goal of using space for the benefit of humankind, and they 
have been unprotested. 
Shortly, after Apollo 11, the Soviet Union also successfully returned 
lunar samples using the robotic Luna-20 mission, the U.S.S.R.’s first of three 
sample return missions.  Similar to U.S. practice, these samples were 
studied by the Soviet Union and distributed to other states for scientific 
study.69  Significantly, the United States and the U.S.S.R. exchanged lunar 
samples as a way to mark an expansion of cooperation between the two 
states.70  The U.S. representative in this exchange stated that, “[a]lthough 
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the quantity of material is small . . . its significance is very great.”71 Unlike 
the Apollo samples, Soviet lunar samples have been offered for sale on the 
private market. In 1993, 0.2 grams of the Luna-16 lunar sample was sold by 
the Soviet government through the auction house Sotheby’s.72 
Finally, in 2003 Japan launched its Haybusa mission.  This mission flew 
to a near-Earth asteroid, collected samples, and returned to the surface of 
the Earth in 2010.73  There were many issues with this mission and the 
sample return was not as robust as expected, but Japan confirmed that 
particulate matter from the asteroid was returned by the craft.  The 
Japanese Space Agency (JAXA) administers these samples for scientific 
research, and requires that any samples delivered for this purpose be 
returned to JAXA.74 JAXA makes clear through its frequently asked 
questions, the ownership of these samples is not transferred by virtue of a 
project being selected to do research: 
Q6. Will I own distributed samples? 
A6. Definitely NO. Samples belong to JAXA. Allocated sample 
must be returned to the Curator as soon as the proposed 
investigation is completed. Exceptions are those investigations 
that consume samples, but this fact needs to be mentioned clearly 
in the proposal.75 
Japan has not distributed these samples widely, likely based on the 
small amount that was collected, but it has partnered with NASA and 
transferred some of the particle samples to NASA for research.76 
Three important aspects of state practice in regards to samples from 
celestial bodies should be noted.  The first is that no state has ever objected 
to another state engaging in a sample return mission, or challenged another 
state’s ability to effectively own and control these samples. Second, these 
samples may definitely be used in ways that provide a “benefit to all 
mankind.” These benefits can flow through scientific research or through 
gains in international peace and security through diplomatic uses.  Finally, 
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there is at least one example of state practice in which a state has used a 
sample for commercial gain. As a result, we can say that state practice 
clearly indicates that Article II does not prohibit states from extracting 
material from celestial bodies, and that states seem to have some set of 
rights to dispose of that material as they see fit. 
B.  Private Claims to Celestial Bodies 
There have been numerous attempts by individuals and commercial 
entities to claim all or part of particular celestial bodies as real property.  
Most of these attempts have been little more than publicity stunts, but 
many have sought to employ clever mechanisms to assert these rights by 
getting a state to somehow endorse the claims.  These claimants usually 
argue that though Article II bars states from claiming territory, it does not 
bar a private individual from owning territory. This argument is rooted in 
a Lockean conception of property as a human right that exists as a function 
of natural law rather than domestic state governance. Interestingly though, 
the tactics of these claimants make explicit the role of the positive local law 
of the state as the arbiter of what can and cannot be private property.  This 
puts their natural law claims into an untenable feedback loop that requires 
positive law to establish property rights. 
There are several such examples of these attempts. One of the most 
prominent is Dennis Hope’s Lunar Embassy, which claims to sell plots on 
the Moon and other celestial bodies to its customers.  The Lunar Embassy 
web page claims that it is “the only company on Earth with the legal right 
to sell land in outer space period.”77  This legal right is based on fairly 
dubious ground.  According to the Lunar Embassy: 
Well, in 1980, a very bright, young and handsome Mr. Dennis 
Hope, went to his local US Governmental Office for claim 
registries, the San Francisco County Seat, and made a claim for 
the entire lunar surface, as well as the surface of all the other 
eight planets of our solar system and their moons (except Earth 
and the sun). Obviously, he was at first taken for a crackpot, 
until, 3 supervisors, 2 Floors and 5 hours later, the main 
supervisor accepted, and registered his claim.78 
There is not any additional information as to what specific type of 
claim is registered, but what can be gathered from this statement is that 
Hope bases the validity of his claim on the basis of its registration by a 
municipal bureaucrat, which he argues rises to the level of state 
recognition.  Further, Hope sent letters to the U.S.S.R. and the UN 
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registering his claim and his intent to own these surfaces.  Hope’s letters 
never received formal responses, and therefore he operates as if they are 
uncontested.  It should be noted that the Chinese government has blocked 
the company from operating in China on the basis that it is fraudulent.79 
A second case is that of Nemitz v. United States.  Nemitz, the plaintiff 
in this case, filed a security interest, under the California Uniform 
Commercial Code, in the asteroid Eros. Then, when NASA landed a probe 
on the asteroid, Nemitz sent NASA a bill for parking asserting that the 
security interest gave him property rights in the asteroid.  The bill itself 
was minimal, but Nemitz’s goal was recognition rather than riches.80  
NASA refused to recognize the claim by Nemitz, and eventually the matter 
was referred to the State Department.81  The State Department denied 
Nemitz’s claim based on Article II, stating “In the view of the Department, 
private ownership of an asteroid is precluded by Article II of the Treaty on 
Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of 
Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies. Accordingly, 
we have concluded that your claim is without legal basis.”82  Nemitz then 
filed suit in the US District Court for the District of Nevada.  This claim 
was dismissed by the court for failure to state a claim.  Specifically, the 
Court stated that registration of a security interest does not create 
“property interests.”83 Nemitz appealed to the 9th Circuit, which upheld 
the lower court without a written opinion.84 
There are other such examples of these types of claims.  For instance, in 
the early 1980s Lamar Savings and Loan Association “filed a request with 
the Texas savings and loan commissioner to acquire permission to open a 
branch office on the Moon.”85  This request would ultimately be rejected.  
While all of these claims tend to philosophically support the idea of 
property as a fundamental human right, they all in some way attempt to 
get the claims recognized by the government through the use of local rules.  
This reveals the thinness of appeals to natural law for the establishment of 
such claims, in that each claimant recognizes the need for positive legal 
recognition to vindicate their claims.  Indeed, the central problem with 
using these cases as precedent, either for or against property rights, is that 
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these claimants universally lack any sort of possession, which the Nemitz 
court found to be dispositive. To circumvent the possession issue, another 
would-be claimant has been shooting a laser beam at Mars for years. He 
argues that this could give him a “legitimate claim” to the Martian surface 
based on the physical contact of the laser beam with Mars, which is cast as 
Lockean labor that adds value to the Martian surface by helping to spark 
the terraforming process.86  What all of these claims lack though, is a clear 
nexus between the lex loci being used to justify the claim and the celestial 
body being claimed.  This is clearly an issue of sovereignty. Recognition 
that someone has made a claim through procedural registration with a 
governmental body is quite different from a governmental body having 
territorial jurisdiction over that body, which is a necessary precursor to 
granting real property rights. 
C.  Private Ownership of Celestial Material 
 While both NASA and JAXA claim sole ownership of their 
extraterrestrial samples, there are several cases in which samples have 
entered into private hands, including the Soviet sale mentioned above.  
This has not yet been the case with any of JAXA’s samples, but NASA has 
numerous samples of which the whereabouts are unknown.  Many of the 
lost Moon rocks are diplomatic gifts that the United States sent to world 
leaders.87 Interestingly, NASA has aggressively pursued claims of 
ownership when it finds private parties in possession of lunar samples.  
Recently, for example, a NASA investigator was subjected to a lawsuit over 
a sting operation in which he detained and interrogated a 74-year-old 
widow of a NASA engineer for suspected theft of stolen property.88 
There are two important U.S. cases on whether individuals can own 
and sell lunar samples that are from the U.S. Apollo missions, over which 
NASA maintains that it has title.  The first case is United States v. One Lucite 
Ball Containing Lunar Material.89 In this case, a U.S. citizen travelled to 
Honduras and purchased one of the diplomatic gifts made from Apollo 
lunar samples.  The gift was a plaque with the lunar sample inside a lucite 
ball and the flag of Honduras.  It was being offered for sale by a Honduran 
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general.  The purchaser then sought to sell the sample to an undercover 
NASA investigator and the sample was subsequently seized. In the 
aftermath, the Honduran government requested the return of the sample 
asserting ownership rights.  The court held that “[w]hen President Lopez 
Arellano accepted the gift on behalf of the Honduran government and 
people and placed it in the Presidential Palace, the lunar rock and plaque 
became part of the patrimony of the Republic of Honduras.”90  The court 
goes on to apply Honduran law and concludes that neither the seller nor 
the buyer in this case could have gained good title since the Honduran 
government never authorized the transfer of the sample. The court does 
not reach the question of whether a purchaser with good title could then 
own the sample. However, this decision does indicate that the transfer of 
title to Honduras means that such a sale would be governed by the lex loci, 
which could allow for such a transfer. 
The second case of interest is the recent United States v. Ary.91 In this 
case, Nancy Carlson was a private citizen who bought a lunar sample 
return bag through a United States forfeiture proceeding.92 The bag was 
previously  stolen from a museum and, after three years, was mistakenly 
auctioned off with other property confiscated by the U.S. Marshall Service.  
The Plaintiff then had the bag tested, which revealed that it did indeed 
contain particulate lunar material.  NASA then moved to set aside the 
original forfeiture sale of the bag, claiming that the bag was sold in error 
and that NASA was not notified of the sale.93  It  argued that “NASA’s 
policy and practice is not to transfer ownership of lunar material to any 
private individual.”94  The Plaintiff argued that NASA had been involved 
in the forfeiture proceedings and at the least had constructive notice of the 
sale, and that title to the bag vested in the U.S. Government, rather than 
NASA specifically, and therefore the sale was a proper transfer of title.95  
The court concluded that while NASA lacked notice, it had no remedy 
against the Plaintiff as a bona fide purchaser: 
By statute, the interest of a former owner is declared to be 
extinguished upon forfeiture, as the lack of a timely petition in 
the forfeiture proceeding means that “the United States shall 
have clear title to property that is the subject of the order of 
forfeiture and may warrant good title to any subsequent 
purchaser or transferee.” 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6). Under this 
provision, legal title to the bag passed to the United States. Title 
was subsequently conveyed to Ms. Carlson upon completion of 
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the auction sale.96 
According to the court, to the extent that NASA was deprived of its 
property through lack of notice, its remedy was against the United States 
directly. While the lunar material was not at the heart of the court’s 
decision in this case, it does indicate that the United States is authorized to 
sell this material, which is consistent with the Soviet sale of lunar material.  
Again, it should be noted that the court applies the lex loci in making its 
decision on the transfer of title. 
While these decisions are not conclusive on the notion of private 
ownership of extracted extraterrestrial material, they both indicate that the 
state has the ability to dispose of such material through a commercial sale, 
and that the subsequent private ownership can be legal depending on the 
local law of the state. 
III. New Local Rules 
This array of state practice brings us back to the inherent ambiguity of 
the Outer Space Treaty.  If space is to be “used” under Article I, and states 
can authorize “nongovernmental” actors under Article VI, but they cannot 
claim space and other celestial bodies as territory, then the question 
remains whether commercial exploitation of resources is possible under the 
Outer Space Treaty.  Indeed, it is exactly this ambiguity that the failed 
Moon Agreement attempted to clarify by providing for an international 
system to govern resource extraction.97  Interestingly, one of the things that 
led to the failure of the Moon Agreement was opposition within the U.S. by 
“advocates of free enterprise in space” who “argued that the treaty would 
increase the entrepreneur’s estimate of risk and stifle investment and 
development in space.”98 However, thirty years later,  advocates of free 
enterprise have begun to advocate for clear rules governing resource 
extraction. To date, two states, the United States and Luxembourg, have 
responded to this new call for regulatory certainty. 
Before looking at those rules, let us first engage with a quick recap of 
how property rights fit into the international legal system.  As argued in 
Section II, Article II is primarily about the concept of territory and fitting a 
new spatial reality, i.e. human space exploration, into the freshly 
established international law system and its imagined geography or world-
scale order.99  While the international law system established after WWII 
does recognize “the right to own property alone as well as in association 
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with others,”100 this right, like most other human rights, is subject to local 
governance within a territory.101  The right to own property then changes 
as one crosses borders and enters new political and legal systems.102  This is 
an important feature within the international legal system because it made 
it possible for states with divergent ideologies to come together as 
sovereign equals.103  Territory is absolute, but property is subject to local 
rules rather than international rules.104  Indeed, the state practice above, 
and in particular the One Lucite Ball case, places lex loci rules as primary in 
making determinations about property.105  In order for local rules to be 
applied, there needs to be some nexus between the territory in which those 
rules govern and the property at question.106  As a result, claims over real 
property in outer space lack true ratification by governments, because they 
exist outside the territorial jurisdiction of the state; whereas, claims over 
extraterrestrial material that has been transported into the territory of the 
state, thereby creating a nexus, will be resolved through local rules.107 
Currently, multiple commercial entities are attempting to raise the 
necessary capital to engage in transportation to and mining of celestial 
bodies.108  These initiatives are high risk for investors and potentially offer 
a high return on the investment, but in light of Article II some investors are 
reluctant to put their money in these ventures without some clarity as to 
whether that investment will be protected legally.109 In other words, 
investors are concerned with whether these companies can own and 
therefore dispose of the resources they extract under the lex loci.110  Both the 
United States and Luxembourg have passed legislation that is intended to 
make these investors feel secure in the legal rights to the extracted 
resources.111 
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The United States passed the first of these laws in December 2015 as 
part of the Commercial Space Flight Competitiveness Act.112  Title IV of this 
legislation states that 
A United States citizen engaged in commercial recovery of an 
asteroid resource or a space resource under this chapter shall be 
entitled to any asteroid resource or space resource obtained, 
including to possess, own, transport, use, and sell the asteroid 
resource or space resource obtained in accordance with 
applicable law, including the international obligations of the 
United States.113 
The law further states that “the United States does not thereby assert 
sovereignty or sovereign or exclusive rights or jurisdiction over, or the 
ownership of, any celestial body,” thereby disclaiming such exploitation as 
an appropriation inconsistent with Article II.114 
Luxembourg, as part of a strategy to attract the space industry to its 
territory, followed suit passing a law in summer 2017.115  This law states 
that “Les ressources de l’espace sont susceptibles d’appropriation.”116  The 
law then goes on to say that such appropriation must comply with 
Luxembourg’s international obligations: “L’exploitant agréé ne peut 
exercer l’activité visée au paragraphe 1 er qu’en conformité avec les 
conditions de son agrément et les obligations internationales du 
Luxembourg.”117 While the Luxembourg legislation does use the word 
“appropriation” to describe the act that it is making legal, it also uses a 
disclaimer about the international obligations of the state.118 The 
Luxembourg law goes further than the U.S. law in that the bulk of its text 
describes the nature of the authorization that Luxembourg will grant for 
these activities.119 
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What is significant about both of these laws is that they are narrowly 
tailored to only grant rights to the extracted resources.120  Neither law 
implies that a commercial entity will gain rights similar to “real property” 
rights in the area of their extraction operations, because real property is 
directly correlated to the territory in which it sits.121  Indeed, both laws 
explicitly note that the international obligations of the state will be a 
limitation on an entity’s ability to claim the property rights over the 
extracted resources, though the U.S. articulation of this principle is much 
stronger.122  These laws create a nexus between the state and the chattel 
property in question through personal jurisdiction rather than territorial 
jurisdiction.123 The U.S. law applies to U.S. citizens and the Luxembourg 
law applies to entities authorized by the state.124  This allows the two states 
to avoid the restrictions of Article II by not asserting their jurisdiction in 
such a way that implies sovereignty over the area of a celestial body, while 
at the same time confirming that a state may authorize a non-governmental 
entity to use space in accordance with Articles I and VI of the Outer Space 
Treaty. 
These laws have stirred much debate among academics as to their 
legality under the Outer Space Treaty.125  Despite the criticism, there is 
growing consensus that these laws represent, at a minimum, valid possible 
interpretations of Article II obligations.126 In fact, such an interpretation is 
consistent with the Russian sale of Lunar material, as well as the 
recognition in One Lucite Ball that the lex loci applies to the disposal of 
tangible property.127 Whether or not these interpretations become an 
internationally accepted standard is yet to be seen, but surely more states 
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will begin to pass laws on space resources.128 
If international consensus supports that states may authorize non-
governmental entities, then numerous challenges are on the horizon.129  
This is especially so in light of the rudimentary nature of these laws.130  The 
U.S. law is devoid of any details on authorization or safety for these 
entities, and while the Luxembourgish law addresses authorization, it is 
more concerned with the financial solvency of the authorized entity rather 
than details about how such activities shall be carried out.131  While entities 
will likely be controlled by local rules rather than international rules, the 
idea of international coordination for safety is one that states should begin 
to take quite seriously.132  One of the central goals of the Outer Space Treaty 
is to avoid conflict through the facilitation of communication and 
coordination among states to lessen the risk of accidents or conflicts in 
space.133  Article VI requires that states keep close tabs on their non-
governmental actors due to the strategic nature of the space 
environment.134  While the commercial exploitation of space should not be 
unnecessarily hampered, it is important to remember that commercial 
exploitation is not a primary goal of the treaty regime, which is squarely 
focused on international peace and security.135  As a result, states should be 
aware of the risk of a “race to the bottom” in the enactment of such laws, 
similar to the flags of convenience problem on the high seas.136  Safety, 
security, and sustainability for all space actors are all critical notions that 
states should give serious thought to when enacting local rules.137 
In order to preserve space for peaceful purposes as new space activities 
emerge, states will need to establish mechanisms to ensure that risk of 
harmful interference is minimized.138  Indeed, there is precedent for such 
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mechanisms in the ITU management of the geosynchronous orbit (GEO).139  
This system is not a full blown legal system, but it has provided a reliable 
mechanism for states to give notice of their activities in GEO.140  This 
regime does not provide “rights” to the orbit, but instead gives states the 
ability to make a planned use known to the international community so 
that other states can plan their space activities accordingly.141  While a 
regime such as that found in the Moon Agreement is politically untenable 
at this time, a system that allows states to coordinate based on notice and 
registration could be an effective way to ensure that space remains conflict 
free.142 
 CONCLUSION: SPACE FOR THE BENEFIT OF ALL 
One of the core values embedded in the international space law regime 
is that states should ensure that space is used for the benefit of all.  While 
this value likely rises to the level of customary international law, it is an 
amorphous obligation that is an aspirational value rather than a hard legal 
obligation.  The principle, however, should not be minimized as new space 
activities, including space resource extraction, emerge.  Rather, states 
should continue to ensure that even commercial uses of space provide 
benefits to the global population.  Commercial entities should not be 
prohibited from making a profit from the use and exploration of space, but 
the space regime treats space as a very different sort of place than those 
found terrestrially.  It would be folly to swing the pendulum too far in 
favor of commercial profit.  This could allow private entities to destabilize 
the strategic space environment, which would destabilize the terrestrial 
security environment. The result would be a use of space for the detriment 
of all humankind. 
This is not to say that there is a need to go as far as equitable sharing of 
profits from resources as envisioned in the Moon Agreement.  While that 
would certainly be one way to accomplish using space for the benefit of all, 
it is one that might overly hinder commercial exploitation and the failure of 
the Moon Agreement shows that there is no political will to establish such 
a system.  Through the Outer Space Treaty, states have agreed to hold 
themselves to a higher standard than they do terrestrially in order to serve 
the entire human population. In the adoption of local rules for new space 
activities, states have a moral and legal obligation to hold their 
nongovernmental actors to similar standards.  While Article VI makes clear 
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that states may authorize the use of space by non-governmental actors, that 
use is still governed by Article I, which requires the use to be “for the 
benefit of all countries.” As resource extraction develops, Article II and the 
question of property rights does not pose the biggest challenge.  Instead, 
the biggest challenge is avoiding a profit driven race to the bottom which 
would gut the underlying values on which the international community 
based the space regime. 
 
